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The combination of negative real budget growth and unchanged operational use 
has stressed the resources of the United States Navy, resulting in an annual average over-
budget execution of $0.77 billion per year in Navy-wide ship depot maintenance since 
FY2010. The Navy’s active ship maintenance budget only supports 70 percent of the ship 
maintenance projected in FY2017; a significant portion of over-budget execution and 
delays has occurred with submarine availabilities. Delays to a submarine’s return to the 
fleet results in a decrease of the overall operational availability (Ao) of already 
diminishing submarine force levels. 
In this thesis, data collected from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY) is 
analyzed to investigate possible factors impacting the ability of maintenance activities to 
complete SSN 688-class submarine maintenance availabilities as scheduled. The analysis 
illustrates a systematic underestimation of availability duration due to the use of outdated 
historically based estimates following a significant shift in maintenance strategy in 2012. 
Additionally, the analysis shows a significant increasing trend in the average number of 
man-days required to complete a job. This thesis provides a narrowed focus for future 
studies attempting to determine the cause of this trend. Finally, this thesis proposes a 
solution to the systematic underestimation of availability durations by illustrating the 
inherent error in the current equation and providing a notional equation to remove that 
error. 
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Progressive increases in cost, manpower, and duration requirements for the U.S. 
Submarine Force are directly affecting its ability to plan and execute the Navy’s mission. 
Commander Submarine Force U.S. Pacific (COMSUBPAC) identified this four-year 
trend in 2015 following a naval shipyard external performance review (COMSUBPAC, 
2015). In response to the trend of elevated attention on shipyard performance and an 
increasingly constrained fiscal environment, SUBPAC N4 has made yearly visits to the 
Naval Postgraduate School in order to coordinate directed research in an effort to help 
investigate the root causes of project growth in Depot and Intermediate level maintenance 
availabilities. 
1. Problem Statement 
From FY12 to FY16 only 38.8 percent of all nuclear-powered attack submarine 
(SSN) Intermediate-level maintenance availabilities at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard were 
completed on time. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has a corporate goal of 
100 percent on-time completion.  
Maintenance overruns create the following problems: 
1. Lost operational availability (Ao), and, therefore, a lack of available 
submarines to execute required missions. This may present a critical risk 
factor for the nation. This maintenance availability overrun has resulted in 
an average loss of 450 operational days per year (COMSUBPAC, 2015). 
The accumulated total late days shows the effective lost Ao due to 
lateness. Projections for PHNSY & IMF for FY17 are shown in Figure 1. 
2. Longer time in a maintenance availability period, which results in extra 
costs that stress the Navy’s budget by creating un-programmed funding 
demands. 
3. Increased uncertainty as to future maintenance planning.  
In order to recalibrate NAVSEA’s models it is essential to understand what 
factors are driving maintenance delays today. 
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The effect of late days on the overall loss to Ao is clear to be seen in Figure 1; the 
late day codes, however, fail to provide any insight into the root causes of the delays. 
 
Figure 1.  Projected Cumulative Operational Days Lost for Submarines in FY17 
at PHNSY & IMF. Adapted from SUBPAC N4 (2017). 
2. Research Questions 
The primary research questions addressed: 
1. Is the negative trend in submarine maintenance availability execution 
primarily a problem of cost, schedule, or performance? 
2. What are the key factors influencing the negative trend(s) identified 
above. 
3. How can the Navy focus funding in order to best position the Pacific 
submarine fleet going forward? 
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B. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
In September 2009, Fleet Commanders Admiral Harvey and Admiral Willard 
directed a comprehensive assessment of Surface Force Readiness, which resulted in 
identifying “improvements necessary to sustain near-term operational commitments 
while achieving ship wholeness and expected service life” (COMSUBPAC, 2015). In 
conjunction with follow-on research, this thesis attempts to recommend opportunities or 
strategies that will optimize the Navy’s use of its allocated resource pool. Two critical 
factors increasing the importance of this effort are the impending attack submarine 
inventory shortfall and the resource constrained budget environment. 
1. Attack Submarine Inventory Shortfall 
Optimizing Ao is of critical importance to the submarine fleet as it approaches a 
shortfall of operational submarines, depicted in red in Figure 2. Based on current 
estimates, the Navy is set to dip below its official stated requirement of 48 submarines 
starting in FY25. 
 
Figure 2.  Attack Submarine Inventory and Shortfall, 2010–2045. 
Source: Eckstein (2016). 
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2. Resource-Constrained Environment 
As the United States Department of Defense (DOD) continues to operate in a 
resource-constrained environment, the efficient use of the Navy’s resources is critical to 
limiting underperformance. Due to most organizations operating with constrained 
resources, each must accomplish as much as possible in order to underperform as an 
organization as little as possible. Defense discretionary spending has been and will likely 
continue to be squeezed due to the increasing burden of mandatory entitlements and debt 
interest on the federal budget. Therefore, the struggle for defense funding presents a 
critical risk factor for the efficient use of existing funding. The lack of real growth in 
Defense spending over the last 50 years is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Federal Spending in CY2011 $B. Source: Kim (2016) 
Over the period 1993–2015, the U.S. Navy has reduced its fleet from 454 to 
272 ships while maintaining a similar level of globally deployed ships. This has resulted 
in an increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) evidenced by the growth in average 
deployment length from 167 days to 272 days shown in Figure 4 (Luther, 2016). 
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Figure 4.  Deployment Length and Naval Fleet Size. Source: Luther (2016). 
In an environment where funding is tight and asset utilization (deployment length) 
is at all-time highs, on-budget and on-time maintenance of those investments becomes 
critical to having the available capabilities needed to execute the Navy’s missions. 
Unfortunately, Navy-wide ship depot maintenance has over-executed its budget by an 
average of $770 million per year from FY10 to FY16, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Navy-Wide Ship Depot Maintenance Over-Execution FY08–FY17. 
Source: Luther (2016). 
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C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
Studies have been conducted within the last 20 years on depot level availabilities 
analyzing historical data from several shipyards across several hull types (e.g., Caprio & 
Leszczynski, 2012; Kalowsky, n.d.). While some studies have identified marginal 
correlations, most have been unsuccessful in determining the root cause of maintenance 
over-execution due to the unique nature of each type of availability, hull, and shipyard. 
An analysis covering all hull types and shipyards prevents an “apples to apples” 
comparison. A better analytical approach is to limit the scope of the analysis by using 
only the same hull type, shipyard, and maintenance availability type. For that reason, this 
analysis is limited to historical data collected from maintenance availabilities conducted 
exclusively at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY) and only on Los Angeles (SSN 
688)-class submarines. Being the higher quantity and older generation submarine hull 
type, the Los Angeles class submarine also presents the best target for providing as much 
historical data as possible under a limited scope. Data is more readily available at 
PHNSY versus other shipyards due to the primary sponsor, SUBPAC N4, being located 
at PHNSY. Finally, each analysis only looks at one type of availability at a time in order 






A. SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE PRACTICES 
Submarine Maintenance is guided by the Submarine Engineered Operating Cycle 
program (SEOC). This CNO-approved maintenance program contains both a Class 
Maintenance Plan (CMP) and a maintenance strategy (OPNAV N9, 2013). Each CMP 
contains all of the organizational, intermediate, and depot level maintenance requirements 
and periodicities for that class of submarine based on the designed service life of its 
systems and components. The two submarine maintenance strategies currently in use are 
the phased maintenance (PM) strategy and the engineered operating cycle (EOC). The 
Ohio- and Seawolf-class submarines use a PM strategy, which consists of short, frequent 
availabilities in lieu of large overhauls. The Los Angeles- and Virginia-class submarines 
use an EOC strategy, which uses a “structured engineered approach” of specified D-
Level, and I-Level availabilities (OPNAV N9, 2013). 
1. Levels of Maintenance 
Submarine maintenance is conducted at three separate levels based on the 
resources and capabilities required to do the maintenance: Organizational, Intermediate, 
and Depot Levels (OPNAV N431, 2010). 
a. Organizational-Level  
The lowest level of maintenance is called Organizational-Level (O-Level) 
maintenance, which consists of maintenance within the capability of the ship’s force. The 
Submarine’s Commanding Officer (CO) is responsible for the conduct and tracking of all 
organizational-level maintenance. O-Level maintenance is conducted on a not-to-
interfere-with operational tasking basis and therefore non-operational periods 
(availabilities) are typically not set aside just for O-Level maintenance. 
b. Intermediate-Level  
Intermediate-Level (I-Level) maintenance is maintenance that exceeds the 
resources or capabilities of ships’ force, but does not require depot-level resources or 
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capabilities. The Fleet Maintenance Activity (FMA) as directed by the Fleet Commander 
(FLTCDR) is responsible for providing the required resources and capabilities for 
conducting all I-Level maintenance. Additionally, submarine tenders provide I-Level 
maintenance capabilities specifically helpful for forward-deployed naval forces due to 
their mobility. At PHNSY, I-Level maintenance is conducted by the Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility (IMF). An I-Level maintenance period may also be called a Non-
CNO Availability. 
c. Depot-Level  
Depot level (D-Level) maintenance consists of maintenance that requires 
resources or capabilities that exceed both O-Level and I-Level capabilities. D-Level 
maintenance must be conducted by naval shipyards or private shipyards. For submarines, 
this typically encompasses maintenance that requires the submarine to be in a dry-dock 
facility. Submarine D-Level maintenance periods are synonymous with CNO 
availabilities and are exclusively scheduled at naval shipyards unless naval shipyards are 
at capacity limits. For the purposes of this analysis, all D-Level maintenance analyzed 
was conducted by a public shipyard specifically PHNSY. 
2. Submarine Maintenance Strategy 
Both USS Los Angeles (SSN 688)-class and USS Virginia (SSN 774)-class 
submarines use the engineered operating cycle (EOC) strategy, which uses a combination 
of major and minor CNO availabilities accomplished at specified times during the 
submarine’s life cycle. Based on the CMP, these periodicities are established by the 
approved OPINTERVAL, OPCYCLE, and service life found in the submarine 
maintenance strategy defined below (OPNAV N9, 2013).  
a. OPINTERVAL 
The OPINTERVAL is the maximum duration that submarine may operate 
between accomplishing specific D-Level planned maintenance requirements (PMR). 
These PMRs must be accomplished during either a minor or a major CNO Availability 
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prior to end of its OPINTERVAL in order to retain its certification to conduct 
Unrestricted Operations (URO). 
b. OPCYCLE 
The OPCYCLE is the maximum duration that a submarine may operate between 
accomplishing specific D-Level PMRs conducted during a major CNO availability. SSN 
688 class submarines only conduct two major CNO availabilities between activation and 
inactivation: Depot Modernization Period (DMP) and Engineered Overhaul (EOH) at the 
10-year and 20-year point, respectively. 
c. Service Life 
The service life is the maximum amount of years that the submarine is allowed to 
operate starting the day it is delivered to the Navy. The number of major CNO 
availabilities and the length of OPCYCLE limit the service life of a submarine. For 
example, a submarine with two major CNO availabilities and an OPCYCLE of 10 years 
will have a service life of approximately 30 years, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Note: The minor CNO availabilities are colored green while the major CNO availabilities 
are colored blue. Each grey circle represents a 6–8 month deployment. 
Figure 6.  Notional Submarine Life Cycle 
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3. FRP and I-Level Availabilities 
Between each OPINTERVAL FLTCDRs are tasked with coordinating I-Level 
maintenance in conjunction with training and operational requirements. The regular cycle 
of I-Level maintenance availabilities, training, and deployments is governed by the Fleet 
Response Plan (FRP). The current FRP in effect called the Optimized Fleet Response 
Plan (OFRP) is designed to optimize: 
“1. Planned force structure and acquisition  
2. Anticipated manning and resourcing levels  
3. Existing and forecasted industrial base  
4. Maintenance and modernization output  
5. Capacity for individual and fleet training.” (COMUSFLTFORCOM/ 
COMPACFLTINST N7, 2014, p. 1) 
Technically, all SSNs have a nominal Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) 
cycle time of 36 months, but this stated cycle time is intended to match the 36-month 
cycle time for the Carrier Air Wing and only really applies to submarines attached to a 
Carrier Strike Group. Greater than 60 percent of SSN 688-class submarines—and the 
entirety of those analyzed in this report—are independent deployers that typically operate 
on closer to an 18- to 24-month FRP cycle. 
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Figure 7.  Simplified Notional Submarine FRP (Independent Deployer) 
Typically, a submarine will have three I-Level availabilities between each 
deployment: Continuing Maintenance Availability (CMAV), Pre-Overseas Movement 1 
(POM1), and POM2, as shown in Figure 7. This CMAV, POM1, POM2 structure is 
flexible with some inter-deployment periods not requiring a POM2 while others might 
require an additional POM3 in order to accomplish of the necessary maintenance prior to 
deployment. All of the inter-deployment availabilities have a combined goal to achieve 
all the required I-Level maintenance that will come due before the end of the next 
deployment. 
4. Maintenance Life Cycle Changes 
The Los Angeles (SSN 688)-class submarine maintenance life cycle has been 
updated several times in response to increased operational and updated maintenance 
requirements. Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of the Los Angeles class submarine 
notional life cycle. 
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Figure 8.  Evolution of Los Angeles Class Submarine Notional Maintenance 
Life Cycle. Source: Nawara (2013). 
The most recent change to the SSN 688 class maintenance life cycle occurred in 
2012 when the OPINTERVAL was increased from 48 months to 72 months. At the time 
of this change, all Los Angeles class submarines had already completed their first major 
CNO Availability called a Depot Modernization Period (DMP). The OPINTERVAL 
change decreases the number of minor CNO availabilities, called Docking Selected 
Restricted Availabilities (DSRAs), per 120-month OPCYCLE from two to one. This 
change effectively increases the time between maintenance of all D-Level maintenance 
from 48 months to 72 months (COMNAVSEASYSCOM, 2010). 
B. TECHNICAL FOUNDATION PAPERS 
Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning, and Procurement (SUBMEPP) 
generates Technical Foundation Papers (TFP) as the primary support maintenance 
strategy revisions to approved notional durations, intervals, and man-days. SUBMEPP 
updates these papers in order to reduce time in depot and maximize the fleet’s 
Operational Availability (Ao). The “Technical Foundation for SSN 688 Class DSRA 
TYCOM Notionals, Revision A of 07 Dec 10” established the initial support for the 
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OPINTERVAL change from 48 to 72 months (COMNAVSEASYSCOM, 2010). This 
document also established the support for updated notional man-day and duration 
requirements for each DSRA. The current governing TFP is Rev B, which updated the 
notional man-days and durations without affecting OPINTERVAL or OPCYCLE. 
1. TFP Rev B Duration Calculation 
Using an analysis of 74 DSRAs between FY98 and FY11, studies conducted by 
SSN Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center (SHAPEC), Submarine Team 
One, and NAVSEA assigned teams, SUBMEPP developed the equation for calculating 
the notional duration of SSN 688 class DSRAs shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Current SSN 688 Class DSRA Notional Duration Calculation 
From this equation, one can see that the only variable input is the amount of “100-
700 TYCOM man-days.” This amount represents the total amount of non-nuclear 
production work planned for the DSRA. The current notional duration of 5.8 months can 
be found by inputting the notional value of 17,772 man-days of non-nuclear production 
work into the equation provided by Figure 9 (SUBMEPP, 2012). From this equation, one 
can infer that limiting resource in a SSN 688 class DSRA is the shipyard’s capacity to 
provide non-nuclear production work. The identified max “burn rate” of 964 man-days 
per week was obtained via historical analysis of prior shipyard DSRAs 
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM, 2010). An additional 560 man-days are added to the notional 
non-nuclear workload to account for warm water effects. The 0.95 factor represents the 
only change in the duration calculation from TFP Rev A to Rev B. While this 0.95 is not 
explained at all in Rev B, it is likely to account for the performance factor of the shipyard 
because the mean cost performance factor for on-time availabilities from 2005 to 2011 
was exactly 0.95 (Caprio & Leszczynski, 2012). If this is the case, the factor is 
effectively building in extra duration to account for the efficiency of the shipyard. 
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Finally, a fixed 7-week end game is added to account for testing post undock. Since the 
change from a 48- to 72-month OPINTERVAL, most DSRAs require a Dual Media 
Discharge (DMD) procedure. This procedure is highly controlled and thus limits non-
nuclear work for a portion of 1 week. This results in a notional DSRA duration without 
DMD of only 1 week less, as depicted in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Notional DSRA Capacity vs. Duration Limitation (with DMD) 
Deeper analysis of the 17,772 notional man-days of non-nuclear production work 
used to generate the 5.8-month duration estimate reveals a reliance on historical averages 
despite the 50 percent increase in OPINTERVAL. The total non-nuclear production 
work number used in the duration calculation consists of six separate categories of 
non-nuclear work: baseline work, fleet-wide required alterations (fleet alts), condition 
based/corrective actions, deferred requirements, accelerated requirements, and new work. 
 15
a. Baseline Work 
Corporate Planning Estimates (CPEs) produced by SSN Ship Availability 
Planning and Engineering Center (SHAPEC) form the basis for updated “should cost” 
estimates at the line item level (SUBMEPP, 2012). These line item CPEs are combined to 
create the new total baseline work estimate. CPEs are validated by SHAPEC through 
historical trend analysis and lessons learned programs. 
b. Non-Nuclear Fleet Alts 
As design-related problems emerge through use, the fix to that problem may 
become a fleet-wide requirement if deemed proper and applicable to the rest of the fleet. 
These fixes called “Fleet Alts” become an additional requirement in each submarine’s 
next availability. TFP Rev B bases non-nuclear fleet alt estimates on the average of the 
total fleet alts authorized for the next four future DSRAs at the time of TFP Rev B’s 
release. It is reasonable to assume that the amount of design-related issues discovered per 
year should be in decline after the SSN 688 class having been in service since 1976, 
therefore, this method should be sufficient to cover future fleet-alts required. 
c. Condition-Based/Corrective Actions per Maintenance Plan 
NAVSEA tasks SUBMEPP to apply the concept of Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) through Maintenance Effectiveness Reviews (MERs). SUBMEPP 
continually analyzes component/system material condition data and age reliability curves 
to refine the appropriate balance between periodic and corrective maintenance 
requirements (SUBMEPP, 2012). The updated condition based/corrective maintenance 
requirements in Rev B are based on historical data collected from the previous five 
DSRAs. The TFP explicitly states that the updated estimate “provides an adequate 
amount of man-days to cover any potential increase as a result of the 72 month 
OpInterval” but the final man-days allotted is simply the average of the conditions 
based/corrective maintenance man-days required under those five previous DSRAs. The 
estimate provided is not actually adjusted away from the average to account for the 
OPINTERVAL change. The TFP goes on to state that the “CPE will be re-addressed as 
more DSRAs are accomplished on submarines after completing a 72 month OpInterval” 
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yet no such re-evaluation has been approved since Rev B’s approval in 2012 
(SUBMEPP, 2012). 
d. Deferred Requirements 
Deferred requirements are requirements that were originally scheduled for 
completion in a previous availability but were deferred to the DSRA having been deemed 
safe to do so by technical experts. This estimate is similarly based on the average man-
days required under the previous five DSRAs.  
e. Accelerated Requirements 
Accelerated requirements are requirements that must be done early in order to 
prevent loss of certification prior to the next available maintenance window. TFP Rev B 
again uses the average of the previous five DSRAs as its CPE.  
f. New Work 
Surprisingly, the largest component of work other than baseline work is similarly 
unadjusted for the 48 to 72 month OPINTERVAL change. New work is calculated as a 
percentage of the subtotal comprised of the baseline work, non-nuclear fleet alts, 
condition based/corrective actions per maintenance plan, deferred requirements, and 
accelerated requirements. The average of new work percentages found in the previous 
five DSRAs is used as the updated CPE for new work. Those five DSRAs were 
conducted having previously operated under the 48-month OPINTERVAL yet the CPE 
does not account for any growth in new work under the 72-month OPINTERVAL. The 
analysis used to determine the new work percentage for future DSRAs operating under 
the 72-month OPINTERVAL is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  TFP Rev B Non-nuclear New Work Budget. 
Adapted from SUBMEPP (2012). 
2. TFP Duration Summary 
The current TFP Rev B exclusively uses the amount of non-nuclear production 
work as the sole input for total DSRA duration calculations. In doing so, all estimation 
techniques used to estimate the notional non-nuclear production workload directly affects 
the resulting notional duration. When SUBMEPP went from the 48-month to 72-month 
OPINTERVAL, they used historical averages to estimate condition based maintenance 
and new work allotments. One could argue that condition-based maintenance and new 
work should increase at a rate greater than pro rata with increased time between 
maintenance, yet these numbers have not been updated since the change to a 72-month 
OPINTERVAL. An update to these CPEs would result in an increase to the notional 
DSRA duration that may explain, at least partially, some of the duration issues observed. 
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III. DATA AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
Collecting all the data required to conduct an analysis proved extremely difficult 
due to the divergent variables maintained by each stakeholder in the submarine 
maintenance world. For example, the SUBPAC N4 shop preserves data pertaining mostly 
to schedule while the Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility (IMF) retains 
more budget and cost-related data. SUBPAC N4 proved to be the most responsive to 
requests for data due to this research being a genesis of SUBPAC N4’s specific inquiry. 
As a result, approximately 80 percent of the data collected was from the historical 
databases maintained within the SUBPAC N4 shop itself. 
1. I-Level Availability Data Collection 
a. SUBPAC N4 
I-Level maintenance availability data maintained at SUBPAC N4 was only 
available during two distinct periods; from 2001 to 2006 and from 2014 to 2017. An 
explanation for the gap in data is unavailable and provides an example of the need for a 
combined data collection effort explained further in Chapter VI.C.1. I-level data included 
123 availabilities from 2001 to 2006 and 103 availabilities from 2014 to 2017. 
Variables per availability collected: (example provided following the colon) 
1. Immediate Superior In Command (ISIC): CSS-1 
2. Ship Name: USS NAME 
3. HULL: SSN ### 
4. Start Date: 11/8/2016 
5. End Date: 12/11/2016 
6. Duration (days): 34 
7. Location: Pearl Harbor 
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8. Type of Availability: POM1 
9. Days Late (days): 2 
10. Cost Expended: $930,346 
11. Man-Days Total: 1,867 
12. Jobs Total: 191 
13. Jobs Deferred: 42 
14. Jobs Cancelled/Rejected: 16 
15. Jobs Completed: 129 
b. PHNSY and  IMF 
An unpublished study conducted by PHNSY and IMF covering FY08 to FY14 
was able to provide a portion of the gap in SUBPAC N4 data (PHNSY & COMSUBPAC, 
2015). For the 193 I-Level maintenance availabilities included in the PHNSY and IMF 
study, only total duration and total man-days used was available as opposed to SUBPAC 
N4’s data which had many more variables such as the number of days late and the 
number of jobs completed. 
Variables per availability collected: (example provided following the colon) 
1. Hull #: ### 
2. Boat Name: NAME 
3. Availability Type: POM2 
4. Start Date: 1/4/2011 
5. End Date: 2/09/2011 
6. Man-Days Total: 1,321 
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2. D-Level Availability Data Collection 
Data for all D-Level maintenance was obtained via the same PHNSY & IMF 
study (PHNSY & COMSUBPAC, 2015). That study included 27 total D-Level 
availabilities from 2008 to 2017, of which 15 were SSN 688 class DSRAs. 
Variables per availability collected: (example provided following the colon) 
1. Shipyard: PHNSY 
2. Ship: NAME 
3. Hull: SSN ### 
4. Availability Type: DSRA 
5. Cost Performance (CP): 0.89 
6. Start Date (SA00): 1/14/2008 
7. End Date (CA00): 6/14/2008 
8. Day’s Late (days): 0 
9. Total Duration (days): 152 
10. 0’s Quantity at Completion (QAC): 2,644 
11. 0’s Actual Quantity of Work Performed (AQWP): 2,611 
12. 1-7’s (QAC): 15,490 
13. 1-7’s (AQWP): 19,367 
14. 8’s (QAC): 5,635 
15. 8’s (AQWP): 6,187 
16. 9’s (QAC): 20,471 
17. 9’s (AQWP): 22,447 
18. Total QAC: 44,240 
19. Total AQWP: 50,612 
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Variables 10–17 above are all a quantity of work as measured in man-days. Those 
variables are labeled at their Ship Work Line Item Number (SWLIN) series level shown 
in Table 1.  
Table 1.   SWLIN Series Descriptions 
SWLIN Series Series Major Ship System 
000 Support Services 
100 Hull structure and appurtenances 
200 Propulsion 
300 Electric plant 
400 Communication and control 
500 Auxiliary systems 
600 Outfitting and furnishings 
700 Armament 
800 Nuclear 
900 Project Management/Admin 
Combined 100–700 SWLIN Series represent total Non-Nuclear Work. 
 
B. DATA NORMALIZATION 
1. Normalization for Content 
Certain maintenance availabilities were omitted from analysis based on several 
criteria. First, all non-Los Angeles class submarine availabilities and non-PHNSY 
availabilities were eliminated as discussed under the analysis strategy. This step 
eliminated more maintenance availabilities from the 2015–2017 period of data because 
more of those availabilities were done on the newer Virginia class submarines. Second, 
only the same type of availability was compared for D-Level availabilities. For example, 
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of 27 D-Level availabilities there were 15 DSRAs, 4 PIRAs, 3 EOHs, 2 DMPs, 1 IA, 1 
ERO, and 1 EDSRA. All of these availabilities are named differently because they 
inherently have different amounts and types of maintenance in each one. To compare data 
points from an EOH and a DSRA would not be meaningful because an EOH is a major 
CNO availability while a DSRA is a minor CNO availability. Therefore, the D-Level data 
analysis uses only the 15 DSRA type availabilities. I-Level availabilities also had a 
variety of names such as FMAV, CMAV, POM1, POM2, however all types are used in 
the analysis. I-level availabilities work in a series together under the FRP to prepare the 
submarine for each deployment. Additionally, I-level availability names are more a 
convention of time in the FRP than of the work inherent in the availability. Therefore, by 
including all types of I-level maintenance, we can get a look at the trends associated with 
I-level maintenance as a whole. 
Finally, a common-sense test was applied to significant outliers eliminating a 
small amount of availabilities from the analysis. An example of this common sense test 
was an availability that had a “Duration” statistic of 5 days but a “Days Late” Statistic of 
30 days. The availabilities total “Duration” is available by subtracting the actual start date 
from the actual end date. Any number of “Days Late” should be included in this period 
and therefore must be less than the total duration. Therefore, for common sense purposes, 
availabilities with statistics failing these basic checksums were removed from the 
analysis. After applying all three criterions, 328 I-Level availabilities are available for I-
Level analysis. 
2. Normalization for Quantity 
This analysis does not normalize the data for quantity because the theoretical 
quantity of maintenance should remain constant over time. Variations in quantity of 
maintenance accomplished per availability should be corrected for via “big data” (the 
large number of data points used). The data is automatically corrected for the decreasing 
number of operational submarines over time by looking at quantities on a per availability 
basis only. Any significant trends associated with the quantity of maintenance per 
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availability is independent of the total number of operational submarines and would 
indicate a primary finding in it of itself. 
The change to the total number of DSRAs per 10 year OPCYCLE (from two to 
one) does not lower the shipyards over-all workload because the newer DSRAs are 
increased in work and duration. In addition, shipyards are staffed and funded based on 
estimates of future needs so increases and decreases in shipyard-wide future workloads 
are proportionately staffed and funded to those levels. 
3. Normalization for Inflation 
This analysis normalizes all cost data collected for inflation using the Naval 
Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) Inflation Indices and 2016 Joint Inflation Calculator 
(JIC). Using the JIC, all cost data is normalized from Then-Year $ to Constant FY16 $. 
Due to inflation alone it is expected that maintenance costs will increase over time so by 
normalizing all the cost data to FY16 $, this allows us to look at real cost growth over 
time. 
C. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
Due to the disparate data sources and the large gap in data previously mentioned, 
two assumptions are necessary in order to allow for an effective data analysis.  
1. Statistic Relevance over Time 
Some data points could have different meanings when compared across two 
periods. However, this analysis treats all such data points as having the same meaning 
over time. For example, a statistic like the number of “Jobs Completed” may not be a 
pure comparison between periods because the meaning of a “Job” may have evolved over 
time. In this instance it is possible that the same “Job A” in 2002 may be equivalent to 
two sub-jobs (Job A.1 and Job A.2) in 2016. In order to rule out these definition errors an 
in-depth analysis into the job-level maintenance is required which is outside the scope of 
this analysis. 
 25
2. New Work Causes Late Days 
An investigation into the cause of overruns in maintenance availability durations 
necessitates the assumption that unexpected new work or re-work is the genesis of the 
vast majority of late availability days. Discussions with submarine maintenance experts 
confirms the assumption that almost all late days are a direct result of new work 
generated in the critical path of the availability or late enough in the availability to 
become the critical path. The submarine maintenance community generally accepts this 
assumption as fact (SUBPAC N4, 2017). This assumption also allows the analysis to look 
at factors that may cause new work or re-work to occur in order to find the root cause of 
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IV. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS 
A. PROBLEM VERIFICATION 
After collecting all the data from different sources, collating, and normalizing for 
content, quantity, and inflation, the first step in attacking the problem is to verify the 
primary issue. After initial discussions with SUBPAC N4, it was not initially clear 
whether the main problem related to the cost, schedule, or performance of the 
maintenance availabilities. 
1. Cost 
The FY16 $-adjusted cost of each I-Level availability is first investigated. Figure 
12 shows the total cost per SSN 688 class submarine I-Level availability conducted at 
PHNSY. 
 
Figure 12.  Total Cost per I-Level Availability 
Contrary to depot level maintenance (Figure 5), the average cost of I-Level 
availabilities has remained constant after adjusting for inflation (Figure 12). In fact, 
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further analysis shows that the real average cost of labor as measured in man-days has 
slightly declined as seen in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Average Cost of Labor per I-Level Availability 
2. Schedule 
Next, the schedule adherence of each availability is investigated. Maintenance 
activities are normally judged on number of days behind schedule. This metric results in 
the number of days late per availability shown in Figure 14. 
 29
 
Figure 14.  Days Late per I-Level Availability 
The total number of days late per availability has increased from an average of 
2.05 days late per availability in 2001–2006 to an average of 7.66 days late per 
availability in 2015–2017. Additionally, there has been an increase in the variability of 
days late, as shown by the histograms presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Days Late per I-Level Availability Histogram Comparison 
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Figure 15 also shows at the y-intercepts how 76.7 percent of I-Level availabilities from 
2001–2006 were completed on time (0 Days Late) as opposed to only 22.6 percent of 
availabilities completed on time from 2015 to 2017. Based on discussions with SUBPAC 
N4 experts and an analysis of several after action reports, this thesis concludes that the 
increase in late days is a result of an increase to the amount of new work encountered 
during the availability affecting the critical path. One opposing hypothesis regarding this 
increase in late days is that the increase is simply due to a stricter adherence to initial 
duration baselines. If this were the case, however, then we should see an increase to late 
days without a corresponding increase to the total availability duration. The positive trend 
to the total duration per availability shown in Figure 16 helps rule out this possibility. 
 
Figure 16.  Total Duration per I-Level Availability 
By subtracting the number of days late from the total duration, we can calculate a 
theoretical “scheduled” duration for each availability shown by the green in Figure 17. A 
stricter adherence to scheduled baselines cannot wholly account for the increase in late 
days because the “scheduled” duration has a near zero trend over time. 
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Figure 17.  Actual & Theoretical Scheduled Durations 
The increase in total duration shown in blue above the “planned duration shown 
in green corresponds with the overall increasing trend of late days shown in red 
(Figure 17). 
3. Performance 
Finally, we measure performance data to see if negative trends exist. All of the 
availability performance reports collected measured shipyard performance via the cost 
performance (CP) ratio, which is the Budgeted Quantity of Work Performed (BQWP) 
divided by the Actual Quantity of Work Performed (AQWP). The CP is also commonly 
referred to as the shipyard performance factor or “SY PF” on reports such as the required 
completion message sent by shipyard via official message traffic (NAVSHIPYD AND 
IMF PEARL HARBOR HI, 2014). SUBPAC N4 however does not maintain this data at 
the I-Level. An alternate way to measure performance, contained within the available 




Figure 18.  Jobs Completed per I-Level Availability 
This measure does not take into account differing availability lengths so the better 
measure for performance available would be the average jobs completed/day per I-level 
availability shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.  Average Jobs/Day per I-Level Availability 
The average jobs completed per day has dropped 1.68 jobs/day from a mean of 
5.22 jobs/day in 2001–2006 to a mean of 3.51 jobs/day in 2015–2017. Figure 20 shows 
how many of the jobs not completed are being deferred or cancelled. 
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Figure 20.  Average (Deferred or Canceled Jobs)/Day per I-Level Availability 
The average jobs deferred or cancelled per day has increased 1.2 jobs/day from 
0.6 jobs/day in 2001–2006 to a mean of 1.8 jobs/day in 2015–2017. The 1.2 jobs/day 
increase to deferred or cancelled jobs accounts for 71 percent of the corresponding 
decrease in job completion. This indicates that the decrease in the number of completed 
jobs is not due to a decrease in maintenance requirements (conceivably from better 
maintenance practices). The daily job completion and deferral rates shown in Figures 19 
and 20 alone could simply show that there is an increase to total availability durations 
without any change to workforce capability/performance. The incorporation of the 
decreasing total job completion shown in Figure 18 with increasing average duration 
shown in Figure 16, however, indicates that there has been either a decrease in workforce 
capability/performance or an increase in job complexity. Figures 21 and 22 show how 
IMF has executed the same average number of man-days per day but how each job has 
taken significantly more man-days to complete. 
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Figure 21.  Average Man-days/Job per I-Level Availability 
 
Figure 22.  Average Man-days/Day per I-Level Availability 
The average man-days/job has increased 5.2 man-days/job from 11.09 man-
days/job in 2001–2006 to 16.29 man-days/job in 2015–2017. The 46.7 percent man-day 
























Decreased workforce efficiency due to less experienced workforce. 
Decreased workforce efficiency due to less resources (budget driven). 
Increased job level complexity without lowering PMRs such as increased safety 
requirements per job. 
Figure 22 indirectly indicates that staff levels have remained constant; therefore, 
the decrease in workforce efficiency is more likely due to workforce experience levels as 
opposed to staffing levels. Explicit staffing level data would better prove this assertion. 
The best way to distinguish between the possible sources of increased man-days/job is to 
dig into the job level data. A comparative analysis of the same job’s complexity and man-
days required over time could illuminate the existence of “man-day creep” (the process of 
incremental increases in the man-days required to complete the same job). This analysis 
is beyond the scope of this thesis but is recommended for future studies. As mentioned 
earlier, this analysis chooses to assume the statistical relevance over time of all variables 
therefore eliminating the job level complexity increase possibility. 
4. Summary 
From 2001 to 2017, both schedule and performance have degraded in SSN 688 
class submarine I-Level maintenance availabilities. With a notionally static FRP, the 
originally scheduled duration of I-Level availabilities has remained the same while actual 
duration has increased proportionately with an increase in late days. Our analysis 
indicates that each job is taking more man-days to complete resulting in less jobs 
completed and more jobs being deferred or canceled per day of availability. The primary 
suspects causing this decrease in workforce efficiency are a less experienced workforce 
and/or a lack of available resources at the I-Level. 
B. KEY INDEPENDENT FACTORS 
The primary independent factors available for analysis on the I-level data are the 
submarine age at the availability and the availability start date. The previous problem 
identification process provided negative trends in schedule and performance. 
Distinguishing which independent variable is the primary driver for these trends is 
difficult because our two independent variables (the average age of SSN 688 class 
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submarines at the time of each availability and the date of the availability) are highly 
correlated as shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.  Age of SSN 688s at SA00 over Time 
In order to distinguish whether issues tied to the date, or the age of the submarine 
itself, are causing the negative maintenance trends we observed, regression analyses were 
performed against three dependent variables: total duration, number of days late, and 
man-days/job. The resulting “p-values” of regression obtained in each of the following 
regression analyses represent the probability that the correlation has no significance. For 
example, the regression analysis of the age of a submarine at the time of the availability 
and the date of the availability yields a “p-value” of zero. This means that there is zero 
percent chance that they are completely independent of each other as we can see visually 
in Figure 23. Conversely, a regression analysis of the age of a submarine and the month 
number (e.g. 12 for December) that the availability starts is completely random and 
yields a “p-value” of 0.28. This means that if we reject the hypothesis of independence, 
we have a 28 percent chance of error. Since the typical threshold for describing the 
relationship as statistically significant is 0.05 or a 5 percent probability (Berger & Sellke, 
1987), we do not reject the independence hypothesis. 
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1. Schedule 
First, the duration of each availability is compared against the age of each 
submarine at the start (SA00) of that availability. There is a definite correlation between 
age and duration with a “p-value” of regression of 0.00569. Thus, we may reject the 
hypothesis that correlation between age and duration is zero. 
 
Figure 24.  Maintenance Duration vs. Submarine Age per I-Level Availability 
A similar relationship exists between duration and the date of the availability. The 
0.0061 “p-value” of regression between duration and date gives a 0.601 percent chance of 
zero correlation. 
The correlation between age and the number of late days is less strong having a 
“p-value” of 0.125 meaning that there is a 12.5 percent chance that late days and age have 
zero correlation. The relationship between the number of late days and the date of 
availability indicates a “p-value” of 0.000197. Therefore, the chances that the date of the 
 38
availability and the number of days late of the availability have no relationship is only 
0.019 percent. 
2. Performance 
As discussed in section A.3 of this chapter, a primary finding associated with the 
decreased performance trend is the increase in average man-days/job. The average man-
days/job versus age regression yields a “p-value” of 0.001345 while the average man-
days/job vs date yields a “p-value” of practically zero (3.18E-09). This analysis shows 
that factors associated with the date of the availability are more slightly likely to be 
associated with late days as opposed to factors associated with a submarine’s age at the 
time of the availability. 
3. Summary 
Regression analysis shows strong relationships between both independent factors 
analyzed and the problems identified in section A of this chapter. A summary of the 
regression analysis: 
 
Figure 25.  Age and Date Regression Analysis “p-values” 
The only p-value that does not meet the typical threshold of 0.05 is the 
relationship between the age of the submarine and the number of days late and age. This 
means that a regression of the number of days late vs age alone is not statistically 
significant. In other words, the increase in the age of the submarine alone cannot 
accurately account for the increase in days late. Unfortunately, the fact that both 








prevents further distinctions. Planners do not explicitly allow longer duration for 
maintenance as the submarine gets older. One possible reason why the relationship 
between the age and days late fails to be significant is due to the lack of late day data 
available from 2006–2014. While this analysis is unable to eliminate age as a 
contributing factor to the issue, it does help dismiss age as the sole culprit to the increase 
in days late observed as well as provide a “more likely” direction for future studies. 
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V. DEPOT LEVEL ANALYSIS 
A. SCHEDULE AND PERFORMANCE TRENDS 
Analysis of SSN 688 class DSRAs conducted at PHNSY from 2008 to 2015 
shows decreasing schedule and performance trends. 
1. Performance 
The D-Level data collected on SSN 688 class DSRAs at PHNSY contains 
Quantity at Completion (QAC) and Actual Quantity of Work Performed (AQWP) 
variables as reported in man-days. QAC represents the total budget for the availability. 
The original QAC is initially set by the Final Review Estimate (FRE) at the Final 
Planning Meeting. These numbers are notionally based on the TFP but are increased due 
to actual Preventative Maintenance Requirements (PMRs). Throughout the availability, 
the official QAC must be changed when certain duration and cost thresholds are 
exceeded. This updated QAC called the FRE-rebaseline is used as the overall budget for 
the rest of the availability (R. Ryglowski, personal communication, April 21, 2016). 
Therefore, in the data collected, the QAC numbers represent the updated FRE-rebaseline 
as opposed to the original baseline set at the Final Planning Meeting. 
  
Figure 26.  SSN 688 Class DSRA Man-Days at PHNSY FY08–FY15 
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Figure 26 shows how the AQWP is consistently higher than QAC and the TFP 
notional man-days. The Budgeted Quantity of Work Performed (BQWP) represents the 
notional man-days for the jobs that were actually completed or, said another way, the 
actual amount of work that was completed. If the availability completes 100 percent of 
the jobs agreed to at the Final Planning Meeting and no additional jobs then the BQWP 
will equal the QAC. The BQWP to QAC ratio is used to determine the overall progress of 
the availability because it represents how much actual work has been completed divided 
by the total planned work. The ratio of BQWP to AQWP called the Cost performance 
Ratio (CP) is used to evaluate shipyard performance because it represents how much 
work has actually been completed divided by the actual cost of the work completed (J. 
Tappe, personal communication, April 21, 2016). This CP ratio, however, does not reflect 
how much of the originally planned work was actually completed. Theoretically, the 
BQWP divided by the original QAC would show this but the aforementioned practice of 
continuously updating the QAC prevents this from being accurate (R. Ryglowski, 
personal communication, April 21, 2016). 
Any new work that exceeds the original new work budget will increase the 
BQWP. If a job initially planned for completion at the Final Planning Meeting is deferred 
or cancelled, this lowers the BQWP. The practice of continuously updating QAC with 
each re-baseline causes the final BQWP to match the final QAC as seen in Figure 26. 
Therefore, unless shipyard executes at a perfect CP of 1.0 or more, AQWP will always be 
over budget (QAC). 
Figure 27 shows the CP ratio and over execution percentages to show how CP 
closely mirrors over-execution due to the practice of matching final QAC and final 
BQWP. Notice the sharp spike (or performance decrease) in FY2012 that corresponds 





Figure 27.  SSN 688 Class PHSNY DSRA Availability Performance FY08-FY15 
Unfortunately, when the QAC is re-baselined the only way to determine the 
original baseline for data analysis purposes is to pull it from the official DSRA Final 
Review Estimate letter for each availability. We do not attempt to pull this data for each 
availability but future studies could usefully look at this issue. 
2. Schedule 
Figure 28 shows planned and actual durations in dark blue and green, 
respectively. The light blue shows the notional duration according to the applicable TFP 
at the time of the availability. Note that the TFP notional duration is non-constant prior to 
the 72-month OPINTERVAL shift in 2011 made by TFP Rev A. Under that TFP, DSRAs 
were given different notional durations and man-days depending on their number in the 




Figure 28.  SSN 688 Class DSRA Durations at PHNSY FY08-FY15 
Additionally, note the greater than four-fold increase in average number of days 
late shown in red. 
As opposed to the performance metrics, the “planned” duration from which Late 
Days are measured represents the original CNO planned days as determined at the Final 
Planning Meeting. As a result, Performance and Schedule are not compared equally 
because Performance is compared against the approved re-baseline while schedule is 
compared against the original FRE duration. 
B. NOTIONAL DURATION APPLICATION 
With each update to the SSN 688 class DSRA TFP, DSRA planners use the 
equation provided by the governing TFP document to calculate the planned duration. The 
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Figure 29.  Evolution of Equations Used to Calculate Notional Duration per TFP 
Despite the fact that the Rev A and Rev B of the current TFP are dated 2010 and 
2012, respectively, a look at the FRE for DSRAs collected indicates that Rev A notional 
values were not implemented until early 2012 and Rev B notional values were not 
implemented until late 2013. By plugging in the final QAC data into the applicable 
equations, we can see that the notional durations per these equations and the actual 
planned durations do not match (Figure 30). 
 
Figure 30.  DSRA Duration Comparison with TFP Equation Result 
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When applying the final QAC data to the applicable TFP equation we see a higher 
notional duration than planned. This is likely a result of QAC re-baselining. This suggests 
that the QAC used is not the original QAC as provided by the FRE. Inputting the final 
QAC data into the TFP equation essential gives the duration result if the planners had 
been given perfect information. As shown in red on Figure 30, the TFP equation given 
perfect information does not adequately provide duration estimates in line with the actual 
durations of the DSRAs as shown in green on Figure 30. Notably, the actual durations do 
not begin to diverge from the TFP result by more than a month until mid-2012, which 
directly follows the shift to the 72 month OPINTERVAL. This divergence indicates that 





This investigation into the factors affecting SSN 688 class submarine maintenance 
delays at PHNSY highlights the difficulty in isolating one or two main factors. Data 
collection, maintenance, and dissemination at PHNSY was bureaucratic in nature. There 
does not exist a combined comprehensive data collection effort available to all the 
organizations involved in submarine maintenance. Each organization only maintains the 
data variables pertinent to that particular organization’s reporting requirements and the 
lack of response to requests for data indicates a reluctance to give those data variables to 
outside organizations. 
The data collection effort suggests that a major issue resides with an increasing 
average man-days/job in intermediate level availabilities (see Figure 21). At the 
intermediate level, maintenance facilities are completing fewer jobs per availability 
despite an increasing average duration per availability. This fact combined with the 
increasing number of deferred and cancelled jobs per availability indicates either a less 
experienced workforce or a lack of available intermediate level funding. The available 
data set for intermediate level availabilities does not contain sufficient workforce 
experience or funding data to prove or disprove the cause of this assertion. Additionally, 
the increasing average age of the submarines alone does not show a statistically 
significant relationship to the increased number of late days observed. 
At the depot level, PHNSY is seeing a four-fold increase in late days despite only 
moderate decreases in cost performance. While the available data set does not contain 
sufficient variables to highlight the exact source of the increase in late days, what we can 
say is that this spike in late days corresponds with the implementation of the change from 
a 48-month OPINTERVAL to a 72-month OPINTERVAL in 2012. 
An effort to determine the basis by which maintenance availabilities define their 
baseline durations yielded an in-depth analysis of the SSN 688 class DSRA TFP. This 
analysis reveals how TFP-based calculations may be systematically underestimating the 
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increase in the notional duration required for the 48 to 72 month OPINTERVAL shift. 
Specifically, many of the estimates used in the current duration calculation are still based 
on outdated historical averages of DSRAs conducted under the pre-2012 48-month 
OPINTEVAL. 
B. FUTURE STUDIES 
Future studies should continue to narrow the scope of analysis using the direction 
provided by this thesis. Specifically, future studies should attempt to answer the 
following questions: 
 What is causing the increase in man-days/job observed in I-Level 
availabilities? 
 Is the same job increasing in complexity over time or have workers 
become less efficient at completing the job over time? 
 If workers have become less efficient over time, is this due to a decrease 
in workforce experience or due to a decrease in available resources 
(funding, or equipment)? 
 Are we seeing a higher percentage of new work or is new work having a 
bigger effect? (confirmation of this thesis’s assumption) 
 If we are seeing a higher percentage of new work, is there a corresponding 
decrease in component reliability? 
 Is there a statistically significant relationship between a higher percentage 
of new work and OPINTERVAL? If so, what should an updated TFP use 
for its new work percentage estimate? 
Future studies will require a multi-person labor effort to bring data at the 
individual availability report level to a self-generated database level for analysis. Future 
analysis must obtain necessary data likely maintained by the shipyard and SUBMEPP. In 
addition to standard duration, cost, and performance data, future studies should attempt to 
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collect data regarding component reliability, workforce experience, and intermediate and 
depot level funding. 
1. Component Reliability 
Despite repeated attempts, this analysis failed to obtain component reliability data 
that may help remove component reliability from the list of possible factors affecting 
increased delays. If we assume that more failures are occurring during availabilities and 
are causing new work that extends the overall duration, then component reliability data is 
necessary to prove that the increased failures are not a result of less reliable components. 
A constant average time between failures would prove this hypothesis. The 
OPINTERVAL increase would represent an increased time between maintenance and 
therefore may explain the increased component failures seen in each availability despite 
constant component reliability rates. Component reliability data should be held by 
SUBMEPP because it reviews this data in order to optimize maintenance practices. 
However, efforts to obtain this data were unsuccessful for this study. 
2. Workforce Experience 
PHNSY & IMF workforce experience levels could also be driving the fact that 
increased new work is causing availability delays. A less experienced workforce could 
have two effects contributing to increased delays. First, a less experienced workforce 
would be less efficient thus directly increasing man-days necessary per job. Second, a 
less experienced workforce could produce less effective maintenance results thus leading 
to an increase in maintenance issues during each availability. Ideally, the increased work 
caused by ineffective maintenance should be categorized as work growth and charged to 
shipyard performance metrics; however, linking new work to past maintenance is 
extremely difficult. 
3. I & D Level Funding 
Future studies should use direct budgeting data to confirm if D-level priority of 
combined PHNSY and IMF resources is causing the decrease in I-Level maintenance 
production. Changes to an Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC) type maintenance strategy 
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requires a comprehensive study of all levels of maintenance, and therefore the interaction 
between intermediate and depot level maintenance cannot be overlooked. The increase in 
deferred and cancelled jobs per I-Level availability indicates that there may be inadequate 
available resources for intermediate level maintenance. The overall decrease in 
completed jobs per I-Level availability may be consequentially affecting D-Level 
availabilities as manifested by the increase in late days observed. Because PHNSY & 
IMF is a combined maintenance facility, maintenance across the yard is provided from 
over-lapping pools of resources. An example report of shared D-Level and I-Level 
resources at a combined maintenance facility is shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31.  Typical “Layercake” Graph of Combined Maintenance Facility 
Capacity Usage. Adapted from sample WF-220 Report FY17–23.  
The dotted line depicting 100 percent capacity level of the shipyard shows how 
the combined maintenance facility normally operates over-capacity. Therefore, D-Level 
and I-Level maintenance often compete for resources. Future studies should compare 
shipyard budget and demand resource levels at both I & D levels of maintenance to see if 
increased resource shortages correlate with poor availability performances. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Invest in Data Collection 
Current data management practices of past submarine availabilities are inadequate 
to provide meaningful root cause analysis of identified issues. Ideally, all maintenance 
should be categorized and tracked under the categories provided by the TFP: baseline 
work, fleet alts, condition based/corrective actions per maintenance plan, deferred 
requirements, accelerated requirements, or new work. These types of maintenance should 
be separately tracked at the 000, 100–700, 800, and 900 Series SWLIN levels. Honest 
reason codes for deferred and cancelled work should be tracked to help future studies 
conduct root cause analyses. Additionally, all updates to estimated levels via a re-baseline 
should be done to each maintenance category at the SWLIN series level. Currently, 
planners use these maintenance type categories in their FRE but once an availability 
starts, the categories are largely discarded for conglomerated SWLIN level QAC, BQWP, 
and AQWP numbers. The separate maintenance categories previously mentioned are not 
further tracked or preserved and therefore a true comparison of work-planned vs work-
completed at completion is not possible. 
Additionally, the way in which new estimates are apportioned during the re-
baseline process significantly hinders statistical analysis of past availability data. The re-
baselines become mandatory when certain duration and monetary deviation thresholds 
are exceeded. Re-baselining is used primarily as an administrative tool to inform various 
higher-level stakeholders of the change to the availability. However, during the re-
baseline process, all of the top line budget data is updated to best estimates at the SWLIN 
level. This typically results in an increase to both the “AWP MDS” and the “NEW 
WORK MDS” (from actual DSRA completion message). While administrative in intent, 
PHNSY uses these increased man-day budgets as their new budget baseline or QAC. 
Theoretically, re-baselining should only result from an increase in new work or due to 
poor performance but an empirical analysis of past DSRA completion messages shows 
that “AWP MDS” and “NEW WORK MDS” are typically increased proportionately. To 
compound the difficulty in analyzing historical data, the databases observed simply 
overwrite the old QAC with the updated re-baseline QAC. In order to compare planned 
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versus actual man-days, future studies will have to pull the original QAC numbers from 
the original FRE message for each availability individually. 
2. Completely revamp the current TFP estimates and equations to 
accurately reflect the 72-month OPINTERVAL change 
Recommend TYCOM implement a new revision to TFP, which discards the old 
estimates and uses all available data for best regression equations. First, there clearly 
needs to be an increased allotment for condition based/corrective maintenance and new 
work based on the increased time between depot level maintenance. The current TFP Rev 
B explicitly states that the Corporate Planning Estimates (CPE) for Condition 
Based/Corrective Maintenance “will be re-addressed as more DSRAs are accomplished 
on submarines after completing a 72 month OpInterval” (TFP rev B) yet there has not 
been any update since its release in 2012. Additionally, the notional new work budget of 
20 percent non-nuclear services similarly fails to account for the effect of an increased 
OPINTERVAL. Because the total duration calculation used is a direct function of 
combined non-nuclear man-days, these updates will probably increase the notional 
duration to match more closely the increased durations observed. However, simply 
updating the corrective maintenance and new work budgets alone will not provide an 
accurate duration estimate. This can be seen by the difference between the actual duration 
observed and the TFP equation result shown by the green and red lines on Figure 30. 
In order to fix the TFP duration equation, we propose using a two variable 
equation to replace the old single variable equation. The current TFP duration equation 
uses the total non-nuclear work as the only variable to the equation. As discussed in 
Chapter II.B.1, the equation attempts to estimate the duration by dividing the total non-
nuclear work by a calculated “burn rate.” This method does not take into account the fact 
that new work and non-new work (or planned work) inherently experience different burn 
rates. This is because new work is more likely to affect the critical path and therefore 
extend the total duration of the availability. When new work occurs it usually 1) must be 
done before another planned work can start or 2) is occurring after all the other 
production work is complete (during the retesting period at the end of the availability). 
This effect is illustrated in Figures 32 and 33.. 
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Figure 32.  Simplified Maintenance Availability without New Work 
 
Figure 33.  Simplified Maintenance Availability with New Work 
In the example provided by Figures 32 and 33, an unexpected part failure has 
caused one man-day of new work, indicated in purple. This purple new work must be 
completed prior to starting the job indicated by the pink block, which is a prerequisite for 
the 2 man-day job indicated by the orange block. As you can see the one man-day of new 
work increases the total duration of the availability from 3 days to 4 days. Without 
accounting for new work the notional burn rate or max capacity observed in Figure 32 is 
5 man-days per day (15 total man-days / 3 days). When one man-day of new work is 
added, the effective burn rate drops to 4 man-days per day (16 total man-days / 4 days) 
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wasting 4 man-days of capacity. This unused capacity observable by the white blocks in 
Figure 33 are not filled in with deferred or cancelled maintenance because the shipyard is 
operating under-capacity meaning those man-days have already been allotted for another 
boat. This decrease in effective burn rate observed by the increase in one man-day of new 
work can be extrapolated to show how an increase in the overall percentage of new work 
will decrease the effective burn rate. For this reason, in order to find an equation that uses 
as much historical data as possible, we propose using a separate average burn rate for 
planned work than for new work as shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34.  Proposed Duration Equation Comparison 
Regression analysis using data from all shipyards should be used to find the 
average planned work burn rate as labeled “PWbr” and new work burn rate as labeled 
“NWbr” in Figure 34. This thesis does not attempt to provide these variable coefficients 
because this thesis only collected data from PHNSY and because accurate new work data 
would be required. Once the variable coefficients “PWbr” and “Nwbr” and the y-
intercept “fixed” are calculated the amount of new work expected using the current 72-
month OPINTERVAL should be calculated from historical averages of only DSRAs 
conducted under the 72-month OPINTERVAL. Under the 48-month OPINTERAL, non-
nuclear new work was calculated to be 20 percent of the non-nuclear planned work. Once 
an updated percentage of new work is obtained, the equation can be re-simplified down 
to a single variable equation if desired. If this simplification is down however, it will 
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become invalid if there is an expected change to the amount of new work such as what 
occurred during the OPINTERVAL shift. 
 The accurate estimation of man-days and duration required for maintenance is 
critical because the shipyard is manned and budgeted to those future estimates of 
demand. As shown in Figure 31, the shipyard is only manned and budgeted to around 70 
to 80 percent of expected demand. The 80 percent limit for overall manning was 
originally proposed by Navy Sea Systems Support Group because in their own study they 
found that “historically, 20 percent of tasks were delayed due to work stoppages” 
(Nawara, 2013, p.11). If shipyards are systematically underestimating the man-days and 
durations required for these availabilities, then the shipyards are also systematically 
underfunding themselves below this 80 percent limit. This systematic underfunding can 
also serve as the root cause to any of the proposed possible causes to the negative 
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